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Essay 
R.T.E. Latham and Change in the Ultimate Rules of a 
Legal System 
PETER OLIVER 
This Article was presented and is written in honour of Professor Richard Kay, 
and in great admiration for the body of work that he has so impressively produced 
over his career. That body of work displays great breadth and depth, and it travels 
through time to make sure that we do not forget the ideas and legacy of 
constitutional writers who came before us. 
I present here another life that in my view illustrates many of these same 
themes. It is a life that was cut short in active service in World War II at the young 
age of 34, at the outset of a career that had already displayed a brilliant command 
of constitutional law and theory. 
This Article and the presentation which preceded it take their inspiration from 
one of Richard Kay’s more recent articles, a piece of legal intellectual history, in 
which he explores the influence of H.W.R. Wade’s famous 1955 Cambridge Law 
Journal article, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty. 
My own Article discusses the life, work, and legacy of R.T.E. Latham. I have 
written before on Latham’s life and work. In this Article, I focus on his legacy, a 
topic that I unfortunately gave short shrift to in my earlier study. 
To my mind, this legacy includes a highly impressive list of insights, some of 
which I have discussed here. Despite their “brilliance,” to use the noun (or the 
adjective “brilliant”) most favoured by later readers of Latham, I cannot help but 
feel that, with a few nudges provided by later theoretical inquiry, Latham’s 
original set of assumptions could have been taken creatively and helpfully further. 
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R.T.E. Latham and Change in the Ultimate Rules of a 
Legal System 
PETER OLIVER * 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article and the presentation which preceded it1 take their 
inspiration from one of Richard Kay’s more recent articles,2 a piece of 
legal intellectual history, in which he explores the influence of H.W.R. 
Wade’s famous 1955 Cambridge Law Journal article, “The Basis of Legal 
Sovereignty.”3 I say “famous” in full knowledge that, for many readers, 
H.W.R. Wade and the article I just mentioned are not household words, 
though they certainly are in some households, or common rooms at least, 
where colleagues talk about United Kingdom and Commonwealth 
constitutional history. 
Right away we can identify one of the remarkable things about Richard 
Kay’s life and work. His interests are broad: He takes an interest in the 
United States, of course, but also the United Kingdom, the 
Commonwealth, and elsewhere. All those who have read Richard Kay 
know that as well as having broad interests along both the X and Y axes, so 
to speak, he is also a deep thinker (along what is often called the Z axis or 
the third dimension): deep not just because he has an interest in 
constitutional theory, but because he always researches and writes with 
such care, consideration, and insight. 
So, I have spoken of two dimensions of breadth—national and 
comparative—and I have noted a third dimension of depth. While keeping 
each of these in the picture, I also want to celebrate yet another dimension 
that we see in his work: That of time. I would not be the first to say that in 
this present moment, we so often find ourselves and our attention spiraling 
all too easily into ever-more-intense interest in an ever-narrowing frame of 
                                                                                                                     
* Full Professor and founding Co-Director of the Public Law Centre, Faculty of Law, University 
of Ottawa. I am very grateful to Sarah Gagnon and Allison Lowenger for research assistance. 
1 This Article is based on a paper presented at a conference in honour of Professor Richard Kay 
that took place September 12–13, 2019 at the University of Connecticut School of Law (Original 
Constitutionalist: Reconstructing Richard Kay’s Scholarship). I am very grateful to the organizers, 
especially Dr. Yaniv Roznai, to participants for their helpful feedback, and of course to Professor 
Richard Kay for his ongoing inspiration.  
2 Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Change and Wade’s Ultimate Political Fact, 35 U. 
QUEENSLAND L.J. 31 (2016). 
3 H.W.R. Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, 13 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 172 (1955). 
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time, specifically the present time and space.4 Ironically, the past has never 
been so accessible to us via the internet, with journals and archives often 
searchable without the need even to leave our desks. And yet, in order to 
investigate the past, we have to be willing and able to formulate questions 
about that past. And that we sometimes struggle to do. 
As academics we are so often working on questions that are not new. 
Arguably, we do our jobs better when we see ourselves in dialogue with 
those who have come before us, as well as those who will follow, 
assuming we do good enough work to make that worthwhile.5 I say all of 
this as an attempt to find an antidote to our universities’ and our society’s 
constant pressure to speak to the present moment, as if doing so exhausts 
the meaning of relevance. Please do not misunderstand what I am saying. It 
is vital for academics to stay relevant and to contribute to contemporary 
debates. The public that funds so much of our work demands nothing less. 
My point is that we do the job of providing intelligent, authoritative 
interventions into current affairs when we work with comparative breadth, 
theoretical depth and a temporal sense that reminds us that we are neither 
the first nor the last to study so many of the issues that are now before us. I 
see Richard Kay’s work doing just this. 
But rather than speak of the breadth, depth, and span of Richard Kay’s 
work, I would like to present here another life that, in my view, illustrates 
many of these same themes. It is a life that was cut short in active service 
in World War II at the young age of thirty-four, at the outset of a career 
that had already displayed a brilliant command of constitutional law and 
theory, and that would intersect in a fascinating way with the subject of 
Richard Kay’s recent work, the very same H.W.R. Wade and “The Basis of 
Legal Sovereignty” that I mentioned a moment ago. 
I. THE LIFE AND WORK OF R.T.E. LATHAM 
So, this Article discusses the life, work, and legacy of R.T.E. 
Latham— Richard or Dick Latham to his friends. I have written before on 
Latham’s life and work,6 so I will only provide a brief summary here. I will 
then focus on Latham’s legacy, a topic that I unfortunately gave short shrift 
in my earlier study of Latham. 
Richard Latham was an Australian, the son of John Latham, later Sir 
John Latham. Latham Sr. was a politician, an ambassador and—most 
                                                                                                                     
4 An idea explored brilliantly by science-fiction writers such as William Gibson. 
5 Richard Kay uses the apt metaphor of academic articles being like so many “messages in a 
bottle.” Happily, as in the case of Kay’s work, the bottles sooner or later find their way onto other 
shores and get read. 
6 See generally Peter Oliver, Law, Politics, the Commonwealth and the Constitution: 
Remembering R.T.E. Latham, 1909–43, 11 KING’S C. L.J. 153 (2000) (memorializing the life and work 
of Richard Latham). 
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famously—a long-serving Chief Justice of Australia. Sir John was known 
for his rigorous, analytical mind, for his generally conservative political 
instincts, and for his formalist legal tendencies.7 
Richard Latham greatly admired his father but would take a different 
path in so many ways. The son’s initial steps were similar: Ormond 
College at the University of Melbourne and the study of law. A 
dramatically new route materialized when Richard won a Rhodes 
Scholarship, allowing him to continue his law studies at Magdalen College, 
Oxford.8 
As his law studies neared their close, he decided to write the All Souls’ 
Fellowship examination, and he was successful.9 His Fellowship gave him 
time to write and think, and to talk things over with some of the best legal 
minds of the British academy and legal establishment. It was through his 
All Souls’ connections that he secured the opportunity to work with the 
visiting Eastman Professor of Law, Professor Felix Frankfurter, later 
justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.10 Frankfurter’s memoirs 
indicate that he was very impressed by Latham, despite their different 
approaches to law.11 They had frank discussions about the sociological 
                                                                                                                     
7 See id. at 156 (discussing the senior Latham as a “leading conservative politician” committed to 
rationalist thought).  
“To most [John Latham] was a name rather than a personality; a man who was 
remote and aloof even as a politician; one who compelled respect, even deference, 
but one who gained the affection only of that smallest circle of intimates who were 
able to penetrate the barrier of shyness and find behind it warm, human qualities.” 
The [London] Times, 27 July 1964, 12. M.H. Ellis described John Latham, the 
lawyer, in the 1920s, as “severe, unsmiling, grey of mien and garb.” Bulletin, 8 
August 1964, 35. Both quoted in Z. Cowen, Sir John Latham and Other Papers . . . . 
Id. at 156 n.21.  
On Sir John Latham more generally, see 10 DOUGLAS PIKE, AUSTRALIAN DICTIONARY OF 
BIOGRAPHY 2–6 (1986) for a biographical discussion, and A.D.G. Adam, Sir John Latham–A Tribute, 
38 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 188–90 (1964) for a “tribute to the life and achievements of Sir John Latham.” 
8 Much of the information in Oliver, supra note 6, summarized here, was gleaned from files on 
Richard Latham at the National Library of Australia (NLA). These documents (photos, letters, school 
certificates, manuscripts, speeches, cuttings, etc.) formed part of the Sir John Latham Collection at the 
Library. The bulk of this collection was presented to the NLA in December 1963, a few months before 
Sir John Latham’s death. The information regarding Richard Latham can be found in Series 10, 
“Family Papers, 1868–1962.” During the course of my research, the materials regarding Richard 
Latham were separated from the Sir John Latham Collection. References to material taken from these 
files will be referred to as follows: “NLA Latham Collection, [series number][date of document].” A 
good deal of additional material was obtained from Richard Latham’s file at Rhodes House, Oxford. 
Reference to this material will be designated simply as “Rhodes House, [date of document].” 
9 Oliver, supra note 6, at 160. 
10 See Letter from C.K. Allen, Warden, All Souls’ Coll., to Felix Frankfurter, Eastman Professor, 
Univ. of Oxford, Felix Frankfurter, Rhodes House, 17 October 1933. 
11 “[O]ne day they asked me if I would take a pupil, a very, very brilliant fellow of whom they 
had great expectations that he was to be a law don. He was Jack [sic] Latham, the son of the then Chief 
Justice of Australia. I said I would, and he came.” HARLAN B. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER 
REMINISCES 256 (1960). I am grateful to the late Dr. Geoffrey Marshall for this reference. 
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jurisprudence favoured by Frankfurter and the more orthodox approaches 
with which Latham would have been familiar.12 There was no indication in 
Frankfurter’s memoirs or in Latham’s many letters home to his parents at 
the time that the latter had converted to a sociological approach, but it is 
clear that he was aware of a new range of concerns, and this awareness 
may well have influenced his legal method, as we shall see.13 
It is one thing to be aware of the perspective of sociological 
jurisprudence and quite another to acquire an understanding of the facts on 
the ground. And yet, whether as a result of his discussions with Frankfurter 
or spurred by his own curiosity, that is what Richard Latham set out to do. 
Richard Latham arrived in the UK in the early 1930s and lived there 
until his death in 1943.14 During most of that time he set out discovering 
first hand that which lay behind the main political events of the day: Spain 
and its civil war, the rise of the Nazis, the wider circumstances leading up 
to the Anschluss, the Abdication Crisis, and the growing number of 
displaced refugees.15 The themes of populism, fascism, identification of 
so-called “friends” and the vilification of so-called “enemies,” and the 
resulting socio-economic and political circumstances that caused these 
                                                                                                                     
12 “I think it must have been at our first tutorial, certainly not later than the second when he 
suddenly said, ‘I see you’re a sociological jurist.’ I said, ‘I’m very glad to be ticketed, but suppose we 
leave tickets behind and just find out what the problem is.’” Id.   
13 Latham’s later writing shows that he had at least taken on board Frankfurter’s reluctance to 
make hard and fast distinctions between logical/analytical and sociological approaches. See R.T.E. 
Latham, Book Review, 53 LAW Q. REV. 579, 580 (1937) (reviewing W. ANSTEY WYNES, LEGISLATIVE 
AND EXECUTIVE POWERS IN AUSTRALIA (1936)): 
If the choice were really between an undisciplined sociological interpretation and an 
anti-socially ‘logical’ one, the latter would indeed be preferable. The certainty of the 
law and the exigencies of government must get on together—but while blind legal 
verbalism merely hampers government, crude perversion of the judicial function 
destroys all law. But that is not the choice. Law (and its logic) and politics cannot be 
mutually exclusive. There is, for the purposes of legal interpretation, no such thing 
as pure logic, and a logic based on political principle in the broadest sense is no less 
philosophically legitimate than a logic of words. It is also a great deal more useful . . 
. . 
Latham concluded that the legal tradition of “the English bench and bar, untouched by speculative 
theory or by conscious ‘sociology’, and heightened, rather than broadened,” is “not adequate to its 
task” of interpreting fundamental law. Id. at 580. 
14 PETER C. OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND 19 (2005) [hereinafter 
OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE]. 
15 In an interview with one of the Australian newspapers on the occasion of a visit home to 
Australia, Latham gave a sense of his expanding interests and his approach to acquiring knowledge: 
“Mr [sic] Latham is interested in politics from a sociological point of view” read one report. Latham 
stated to the journalists that there was no way of learning anything about “politics in dictatorship” 
without doing so “first hand.” This was because the government controlled the newspapers, but also 
because political opinion is always less unanimous than the press presents. Australians Play Big Part in 
English Universities, [MELBOURNE] STAR, Aug. 6, 1935. Latham had already travelled to Germany, 
Austria, and Italy and was about to see Japan, China, and Russia. 
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so-called “enemies” to move across Europe and the world in search of 
safety and security—all of these are themes that resonate today, sadly. 
When I say that Richard Latham set out to learn the facts on the 
ground first hand, I do not mean political tourism. When Latham went to 
Spain, he volunteered to drive vehicles for the Republicans.16 When he 
went to Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria, he researched the 
fast-changing politics and made contacts with refugees and refugee 
organizations, contacts that he would later use to assist Jewish and other 
refugees in escaping an increasingly unsafe European mainland.17 
Latham’s “sociologically” inspired travels did not exclude indulging 
his more academic interests. During his time working as a temporary 
collaborator with the League of Nations in Geneva, Latham secured a visit 
with Professor Hans Kelsen,18 and the latter saw fit to offer his young 
visitor a copy of Reine Rechtslehre, published in German in 1934 and 
nowhere available in English until a much later date.19 That vellum-bound 
copy, complete with Latham’s marginal notes, still sits in the law library of 
King’s College London, so far as I know. It is clear from Latham’s notes in 
that copy and from his subsequent constitutional writing that Latham read 
Kelsen closely. 
Latham’s German was good enough to read Kelsen’s monograph and 
to rely on Kelsen in the writing of Latham’s main contribution to 
constitutional law, history, and theory, a chapter in W.K Hancock’s, 
Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, volume I, entitled “The Law and 
the Commonwealth,” published posthumously as a monograph by Oxford 
University Press in 1949.20 Latham acknowledged a great debt to Kelsen’s 
                                                                                                                     
16 In the spring of 1937, Latham wrote letters to the British government in support of Spanish 
Medical Aid work and then, during the summer break from university teaching (he was by then a 
Lecturer at King’s College, University of London), sought and acquired employment as a vehicle driver 
in France, running food supplies across the Spanish border to sustain colonies of refugee children who 
had fled the destruction of the Spanish civil war. Letter from Richard Latham to his mother, NLA 
Latham Collection, 10/26 September 1937. 
17 Over the Christmas vacation of 1938, Latham travelled to Berlin on behalf of a Jewish refugee 
organization and made use of his serviceable German both to help Jews get out of Germany and to 
investigate other cases. In March 1939 he returned to the continent, this time to the Dutch-German 
border dealing with visa matters for the British Committee of Refugees from Czechoslovakia. He wrote 
to his parents about one Jewish woman who had married a Czech for his nationality and lost all her 
money to him before having to flee westward. She had just received news that her sister-in-law and 
brother had committed suicide in Vienna. Latham let her through, despite the absence of the required 
proof of a financial guarantor in England, and he subsequently put her up with friends in London and 
Oxford. Letter from Richard Latham to his father, NLA Latham Collection, 10/15 January 1939; Letters 
from Richard Latham to his mother, NLA Latham Collection, 10/24 March and 22 April 1939. 
18 In a letter to his father, Latham described Kelsen as “perhaps the most stimulating jurist of 
today.” He noted that “practically nothing of his work is translated.” Letter from Richard Latham to his 
father, NLA Latham Collection, 10/18 August 1936. 
19 HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE (1934). For the English translation of the second edition, 
see HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (1960). 
20 R.T.E. LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH 510–610 (Greenwood Press 1970) 
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ideas regarding the concept of a legal system, but he felt the need to 
qualify his adoption of the great constitutional thinker’s ideas: “But the 
adoption of Kelsen’s calculus of formal validity and of his Kantian a priori 
derivation of it must not be taken to commit the writer to Kelsen’s estimate 
of the actual importance of the purely rational or formal element in law.”21 
(Latham did not specify what more was required beyond that purely 
rational and formal, that had after all been the intellectual framework of his 
upbringing and so much of his legal education, but, judging by his other 
writings, one suspects that a sociological awareness might have been part 
of what he had in mind.) 
When back in London, Latham was practicing law and lecturing 
part-time at the University of London.22 His colleagues included Sir Ivor 
Jennings, challenger though never entirely successor to Dicey’s 
heavyweight crown as leading champion of United Kingdom, and therefore 
Empire and Commonwealth, constitutional law.23 One of the reasons why 
Jennings failed to topple Dicey and the constitutional orthodoxy 
surrounding him was the role played by Richard Kay’s subject of study, 
H.W.R. Wade.24 My contention in this article is that while Dicey and his 
apologist H.W.R. Wade ruled the day through the middle part of the 
twentieth century, Jennings perspective, crucially underpinned by 
Latham’s insights, had won out by the end of the century. 
Latham’s writing takes in parliamentary sovereignty, constituent 
processes, basic norms, constitutional change, revolution, uncertainty, 
constitutional evolution, and constitutional pluralism—all themes that 
resonate, I believe, with others’ papers presented at the conference in 
honour of Richard Kay. 
II. DISCOVERING R.T.E. LATHAM 
I first came across the name Richard Latham when I was researching 
my doctoral thesis at Oxford University. I knew that I wanted to discuss 
the new Canadian amending formula put into place for the first time at the 
moment Canadians refer to as “patriation”——that is, the United Kingdom 
Parliament enactment of its final legislation for Canada: the Canada Act 
1982 (UK) that set out the new Constitution Act, 1982 in its Annex, while 
at the same time purporting to terminate that same United Kingdom 
Parliament’s power to legislate for Canada. I realized that I could discuss 
the new Canadian Constitution and its amending formula in a 
straightforward if rudimentary way, but I first needed to explain how to 
                                                                                                                     
(1937) [hereinafter LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH]. 
21 Id. at 522–23. 
22 OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 14, at 85. 
23 Id. at 19, 81. 
24 Id. at 92–93. 
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make legal sense of the momentous constitutional event that was the 1982 
patriation. Everyone, including the experts and the Supreme Court of 
Canada itself,25 seemed to assume that patriation had been legal and 
effective, but no one could explain how this could be so in the face of a 
by-then still-dominant theory of ongoing or continuing parliamentary 
sovereignty.26 
Richard Kay’s H.W.R. Wade would have referred to 1982 as “the 
naked fact of revolution” disguised in “elaborate legal dress.”27 My own 
supervisor, the late Dr. Geoffrey Marshall, had proposed legal solutions in 
the 1950s28 just after Wade wrote the famous article, but Marshall was 
never convinced that his own view had won the day, so he was inclined to 
say that independence acts achieved their purpose in law and in fact, 
though no one could quite agree on why that was so.29 That realistic 
account was probably accurate so far as it went, but for the purpose of my 
doctoral thesis, and perhaps especially in support of what I hoped would be 
a successful doctoral defence, I needed to find a legally persuasive answer 
rather than simply an accurate factual observation. 
So perhaps you can imagine how I felt when I came across The Law 
and the Commonwealth30 in which Latham worried in 1937 about just the 
sorts of legal questions that I had encountered, all the while trying (in 
Latham’s case) to remain in touch with the facts on the ground as he 
observed them. This was the approach I was looking for, and in many ways 
it is still the approach that I prefer to this day, though I have added a 
number of embellishments, for better or for worse. 
III. LATHAM’S IDEAS AND INFLUENCE 
A. Ultimate Rules 
We should perhaps begin with Latham on parliamentary sovereignty, 
as that road leads to his broader theoretical concerns. All British and 
Commonwealth constitutional scholars cut their teeth on the idea of 
parliamentary sovereignty,31 and Latham was no exception. What 
                                                                                                                     
25 Reference re Objection to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793, 806 
(Can.). 
26 OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 14, at 156. 
27 H.W.R. Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, 1955 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 172, 191. 
28 See GEOFFREY MARSHALL, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE COMMONWEALTH 16–29 
(1957) (discussing the power of judicial review and United States courts’ power to regulate the 
legislative body).  
29 Id. 
30 LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 20. 
31 For a thorough and perceptive history of parliamentary sovereignty, see JEFFREY 
GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 9–16 (2004). For a 
discussion of the relevance of parliamentary sovereignty in the Commonwealth, particularly Australia, 
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differentiated Latham was, as I have noted with Richard Kay, the breadth 
and depth of his approach to the topic. He realized (and it may help readers 
who are not U.K. and Commonwealth constitutional experts to follow him 
here) that parliamentary sovereignty is effectively the ultimate rule of the 
United Kingdom, its Empire and, for a time, the Commonwealth as well. It 
was the Grundnorm or basic norm, to use Kelsen’s vocabulary.32 It could 
be said that, unlike Kelsen, Latham realized that even identifying 
something as an “ultimate rule” (and with it the supporting “basic norm”) 
is ambiguous. One needs to know whether the ultimate rule can be used to 
change itself, or whether the ultimate rule alone remains unchanged and 
unaltered while lesser rules evolve and change. The former take explains 
the usual assumptions around constituent processes and amending 
formulae—that they can be used simultaneously to validate new 
constitutional rules and to terminate the original power-granting power 
going forward. The latter view explains the persistence of the United 
Kingdom Parliament’s sovereignty over so many centuries, though it has 
more difficulty explaining twentieth-century developments such as 
Commonwealth independence processes, accession to and departure from 
the European legal order, devolution within the United Kingdom, and the 
protection of human rights under a system of parliamentary sovereignty. In 
order to explain all of this properly we need to go back to Latham’s views 
on parliamentary sovereignty.  
B. Latham on Parliamentary Sovereignty33 
So what did Latham have to say about sovereignty of Parliament that 
was so enlightening? The first part of the Latham take is an article that 
Latham published prior to writing The Law and the Commonwealth. In 
“What is an Act of Parliament,”34 Latham observed that one cannot know 
what it means to say that Parliament is sovereign unless one knows what 
one means by “Parliament.”35 Similarly, one can say that the people are 
sovereign, but, according to Latham, it is not possible to give legal 
                                                                                                                     
Canada, and New Zealand, see OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 14, at 54–
61. See also JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 
(2010).  
32 See Hans Kelsen, Introduction to GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE, at xxvii–xxviii 
(Anders Wedberg trans., 1945) (elaborating a positivist legal theory based on a basic norm or 
Grundnorm); KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW, supra note 19, at 8–9 (elaborating again a positivist 
legal theory based on a basic norm or Grundnorm). For a brief account of Kelsen, the pure theory of 
law, and the Grundnorm, see Andrei Marmor, The Pure Theory of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL. (Jan. 4, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/lawphil-theory/. 
33 Richard Kay’s views on sovereignty are discussed in Richard S. Kay, Changing the United 
Kingdom Constitution: The Blind Sovereign, in SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LAW: DOMESTIC, EUROPEAN, 
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 98, 110–16 (Richard Rawlings et al. eds., 2013). 
34 R.T.E. Latham, What is an Act of Parliament?, KING’S COUNSEL 152 (1939). 
35 Id. at 152–53. 
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meaning to that statement until one knows how the people will 
communicate their sovereign will.36 A crowd shouting incoherently can 
express a physical and audible force but not a legislative will.37 Similarly, 
and here bringing in another theme of the Richard Kay conference, we 
cannot know what we mean by constitutional supremacy until we know 
how the constitution will be interpreted, whether according to original or 
evolving understandings, for instance. 
Initially, Latham’s insight encouraged what is still referred to as the 
“new view” of parliamentary sovereignty.38 That view is usually expressed 
as an exception to the general Diceyan rule that Parliament cannot bind a 
future Parliament. The exception is that a Parliament can perhaps bind a 
future Parliament as to the “manner and form” of its legislation.39 Without 
going into a full elaboration of the issue, I hope that readers can see that 
the so-called “manner and form” exception to parliamentary sovereignty is 
an unstable position; it is the sort of halfway house in which pragmatic 
British and Commonwealth constitutional lawyers sometimes prefer to 
live. But when push comes to shove, either the clearly expressed view of a 
future, ordinarily constituted Parliament prevails, or the dictates of the 
earlier Parliament prevail. The so-called “manner and form” exception was 
really  sitting on a fault line between what H.L.A. Hart would later label 
“continuing” and “self-embracing” sovereignty.40 Partly as a result of 
Latham’s ground-breaking insights, Hart, unlike so many before him who 
were very much in the thrall of Dicey, made clear that both continuing 
sovereignty—the idea that Parliament may do everything except limit 
itself—and self-embracing sovereignty—the idea that Parliament may do 
everything including limit itself—are equally viable.41 As Latham put it, 
“the mere assertion of the omnipotence of a sovereign leaves completely 
uncertain the fundamental question whether or not he can bind himself.”42 
                                                                                                                     
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 153. 
38 See OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 14, at 76–77 (discussing new 
thinking about parliamentary sovereignty). See also Geoffrey Marshall, The Constitution: Its Theory 
and Interpretation, in THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 29, 46 (Vernon 
Bogdanor ed., 2003) (discussing the new and revised takes on parliamentary sovereignty).  
39 OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 14, at 77; GEOFFREY MARSHALL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 44 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1971).  
40 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 149 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW]. 
41 Id. at 149–50. See also H.L.A. HART, Self-Referring Laws, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY 170, 177 (1983) [hereinafter HART, Self-Referring Laws] (categorizing both 
self-embracing and continuing sovereignty as “intelligible . . . constitutional arrangements”).  
42 LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 20, at 523. This quotation from 
Latham was referred to, even as early as the 1950s, as an “almost classical” statement of a more 
modern (both “new” and “revised”) view of sovereignty. For references to this quotation in similar 
terms, see, for example, Wade, supra note 3, at 187 n.45, E.C.S. Wade, Introduction to A.V. DICEY, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, at xl–xli, xli n.1 (10th ed. 1959), 
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This insight moved beyond the “new view” and towards what I and others 
have referred to as the “revised view” of parliamentary sovereignty.43 
It was certainly the case that with Dicey’s help, “continuing” 
sovereignty was in a dominant position, a holder of what I referred to 
earlier as the heavyweight crown of United Kingdom and Commonwealth 
constitutional law.44 However, Latham pointed out, apparently for the first 
time, that Dicey “was unable to cite a single decided case as authority for 
his classic exposition of the sovereignty of Parliament.”45 Continuing 
sovereignty clearly suited Dicey’s Unionist politics; but why was it to be 
preferred in the absence of authority? As the twentieth century progressed, 
Commonwealth scholars would increasingly point to Dicey’s later-edition 
references to the possibility of terminating sovereignty,46 but nowhere in 
Dicey’s theory of sovereignty could one find how this squared with his 
background assumption of absolute and continuing sovereignty. In Dicey’s 
theoretical construct, termination of sovereignty seemed vulnerable 
(logically, if not always realistically) to reassertion of the continuing 
authority of the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament.47 
Unlike Dicey, Latham sought after explanation rather than dogmatic 
assertion. Briefly, Latham anticipated two jurisprudential currents—
Hartian and Dworkinian—that would later be expanded upon by leading 
legal thinkers of the twentieth century. 
We have already seen that Latham observed that, though the 
sovereignty of Parliament could be illustrated by various examples, the 
continuing nature of that sovereignty could not be supported by authority. 
This meant that one of Dicey’s key dogmas—that no Parliament could 
bind a future Parliament—was in fact a question or an uncertainty. Like all 
hypothetical questions of law, it would be answered in the fulness of time, 
when the matter came fully and properly before a court. In the meantime, 
however, as H.L.A. Hart would later observe, it was a formalist error for 
lawyers to assume answers to hard, uncertain questions, in advance of their 
resolution.48 The assertion of continuing parliamentary sovereignty was 
arguably one example of this sort of formalist error.  
                                                                                                                     
and Hamish R. Gray, The Sovereignty of Parliament Today, 10 U. TORONTO L.J. 54, 63 (1953) (“[A] 
passage which has become almost classical.”). 
43 OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 14, at 85. See also Marshall, supra 
note 38, at 45–47 (identifying new and revised views on sovereignty). 
44 See supra text accompanying note 23. 
45 LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 20, at 525 (footnote omitted). 
46 DICEY, supra note 42, at 68 n.1. 
47 OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 14, at 289 n.15. 
48 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 40, at 153. 
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Latham’s attention to the facts on the ground caused him to notice not 
just the uncertainty in the law as a general matter,49 but also the fact that 
courts in many parts of the centrifugally-evolving Commonwealth were 
coming up with different answers regarding the nature of sovereignty than 
those that might be thought to be preferred by their U.K. counterparts. 
Whatever one might think of their quality as legal decision makers in 
formal terms, the Irish and South African courts in the 1930s were 
reaching different interpretations regarding the Statute of Westminster, 
1931,50 for example, than those preferred by the U.K. courts and Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council; and the former interpretations were 
largely acceptable to the local Irish and South African communities.51 
Latham was anticipating Hart’s writing on uncertainty in the rule of 
recognition,52 the pathology of legal systems,53 and the real possibility of 
conflicting perspectives emanating from different legal systems regarding 
the same legal act. More will be said about this in a moment. 
Latham went further. Anticipating the writings of Ronald Dworkin, 
Latham saw the importance not just of background assumptions regarding 
sovereignty, but also the significance of, in Latham’s words, “the basic 
beliefs of the judges themselves.”54 This observation took the 
jurisprudential approach beyond indeterminacy and shifting assumptions 
regarding the ultimate rule over time, and into the concept of adjudication 
where Dworkin was later to make such an impact. 
C. The Grundnorm, or Basic Norm, and the Facts on the Ground 
There are some wonderful phrases in The Law and the Commonwealth 
that capture what I have said regarding parliamentary sovereignty, its 
uncertainty and its evolution, and that translate all that back into the 
language of the Grundnorm or basic norm, thereby either improving or 
disrespecting Kelsen, depending on one’s view. 
Regarding Ireland, for instance, Latham, the sociologically-aware 
constitutional lawyer, quotes Dublin graffiti—“Damn your concessions, 
England”55—and comments that “the Grundnorm has descended into the 
                                                                                                                     
49 Latham noted that “in such frontier regions,” figuratively speaking, further from “the centre of 
established doctrine . . . to require self-sufficiency of legal scholarship is to ensure not its chastity but 
its sterility.” LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 20, at 521.  
50 Statute of Westminster 1931, 22 Geo. 5. c. 4 (UK). 
51 R.T.E. LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH 527–40 (1949).   
52 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 40, at 147–48. 
53 Id. at 117–20. 
54 LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 20, at 525. See also David 
Dyzenhaus, The Demise of Legal Positivism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 112, 120 (2005) (citing Latham in 
discussing how judges use moral judgments in their rulings). 
55 LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 20, at 534. 
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market-place.”56 What a wonderfully evocative and provocative phrase! 
With regard to the points made earlier about different courts in 
different jurisdictions taking different views over time regarding, for 
example, the sovereignty question, Latham had the following to say: “It 
may . . . be said, and not in any cynical way, that the Grundnorm of a 
case-law system is simply the sum of those principles which command the 
ultimate allegiance of the courts.”57 Here we are very close to what Hart 
later called the rule of recognition.  Latham continues: “This loose 
definition opens up possibilities of indeterminacy of Grundnorm and of 
shifting of Grundnorm which will be illustrated in the next few pages.”58 
These comments on the indeterminacy and shifting of the Grundnorm were 
wholly original. They translate into Hartian terms in the form of 
“uncertainty in the rule of recognition.”59 How the ultimate rule shifts will 
be the subject of the final section of this Article. 
After illustrating the shifting Grundnorm, Latham arrives at a 
conclusion that sounds much like H.W.R. Wade, as Richard Kay and 
others will recognize, I think. Latham says: “A change of Grundnorm is, 
by definition, an event outside and prior to the law. It constitutes a 
technical revolution, for the Grundnorm embodies the identity of the 
State.”60 And foreshadowing Wade’s most famous phrase, quoted earlier,61 
Latham counselled that “[t]here is much to be said for stealth and subtlety 
as methods of revolution, if revolution there must be.”62 Not only is this 
reminiscent of Wade, but, as noted a moment ago, it is also reminiscent of 
Hart’s discussion of  the pathology of legal systems. Hart there employs 
Latham’s reminder that in Commonwealth devolution, for example, it is 
possible for United Kingdom courts to take one view of an Independence 
Act emanating from the Westminster Parliament and for the courts of a 
newly independent country to take a different view.63 The rule of 
recognition is ultimately a question of the ultimate allegiance of the courts, 
as Hart and later Raz would say.64 
                                                                                                                     
56 Id. at 534–35. 
57 Id. at 525. 
58 Id. 
59 Michael Bayles, Hart vs. Dworkin, 10 LAW & PHIL. 349, 355 (1991). 
60 LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 20, at 540. 
61 See Wade, supra note 27 and text accompanying note 27 (referencing H.W.R. Wade’s 
infamous quote). 
62 LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 20, at 534 (footnote omitted). 
63 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 40, at 120–22. 
64 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 192 (2d ed. 1980) (“[T]he identity and 
actions of primary law-applying organs are essential in establishing the membership of a legal 
system.”). 
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IV. BUILDING ON LATHAM’S UNDERSTANDING OF ULTIMATE RULES 
In this final section, I would like to explore how well the Latham of the 
1930s anticipated the constitutional conundrums and solutions of the rest 
of the twentieth century. Some of the tools that Latham provided needed to 
be repurposed, but most of what was required was already in place, which 
is remarkable given that H.W.R. Wade, Hart, Ross, Finnis, Raz, Dworkin, 
and others had not yet provided any assistance in the task. 
Just by way of recap, here are some of the tools that Latham set out: 
• Dicey’s version of continuing sovereignty is in fact 
asserted rather than grounded in judicial authority.65 
(Two cases decided in the 1930s – Vauxall Estates and 
Ellen Street—would come to be viewed as authority for 
continuing sovereignty, although they represent at best 
very weak obiter dicta.)66 
• Stating that Parliament is sovereign says nothing about 
whether that Parliament can or cannot limit itself.67 (This 
is what H.L.A. Hart later referred to as the equally 
credible “self-embracing” and “continuing” 
sovereignty.)68 
• Despite the undoubted importance of an ultimate rule or 
Grundnorm such as that regarding Parliament’s 
sovereignty, there can be uncertainty in the rule or 
Grundnorm (as Hart discussed in Chapter Six under the 
heading “Uncertainty in the Rule of Recognition”).69 
• While it is natural for constitutional scholars and ardent 
observers of the constitution to speculate as to how the 
uncertainties just referred to should be resolved, such 
questions are not resolved until they are presented before 
the courts for authoritative resolution.70 (Hart referred to 
                                                                                                                     
65 LATHAM, supra note 20, at 525. 
66 On this point, see OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 14, at 70–72 
(addressing the supposed rule of parliamentary sovereignty that the sovereign Westminster Parliament 
could never effectively bind its successors).  
67 Michael Gordon, The UK’s Fundamental Constitutional Principle: Why the UK Parliament Is 
Still Sovereign and Why It Still Matters, 26 KING’S L.J. 229, 232 (2015) (citing R.T.E. Latham, What is 
an Act of Parliament?, KING’S COUNSEL 152 (1939)). 
68 See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 40, at 149. 
69 See id. at 147–48 (describing uncertainty as it relates to the rule of recognition). 
70 See LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 20, at 521 (“A simple 
pragmatic view of the nature of law is assumed throughout: that that only is law which is declared and 
enforced by the courts, or will be declared and applied by the courts if occasion arises; where it is not 
applied, it is not law.”). 
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the tendency to provide clear answers in place of 
uncertainties as a common “‘formalist’ error.”)71 
• What Hart was to say regarding uncertainty in the rule of 
recognition, Latham had already said with respect to its 
functional Kelsenian equivalent, the Grundnorm: 
“Clearly in such a system [the English system of case 
law] there is no certainty that the most fundamental 
principle, the Grundnorm, will be reached and declared 
by the courts. It may be that no case will arise which 
necessitates resort to the ultimate rule. Yet at any time 
such a case may arise . . . .”72  
• If one were to ask, then, according to which factors the 
Grundnorm shifted or became more determinate, 
Latham’s apparent answer would be what we would later 
recognize as Dworkinian on the one hand (the 
importance of the basic beliefs of judges charged with 
interpreting the law) and context-based on the other.73 
Latham’s context-based considerations were both legal 
and non-legal. In terms of legal context, Latham noted 
(as Hart would later, regarding the pathology of a legal 
system) that local courts sometimes adopted different 
legal takes than UK courts regarding the same legal 
event: Enactment of independence legislation for 
instance.74 Whatever one’s view of the quality of the 
local courts’ reasoning, it was hard to deny its legal 
effect, especially where the legal system in question was 
now independent of the former metropole. In terms of 
factual context, Latham acknowledged the force of 
revolutionary realities, as Kelsen himself had done. 
To my mind, this is already a highly impressive list of insights. Despite 
their “brilliance,” to use the noun (or the adjective “brilliant”) most 
favoured by later readers of Latham, I cannot help but feel that, with a few 
nudges provided by later theoretical inquiry, Latham’s original set of 
assumptions could have been taken creatively and helpfully further. What 
do I mean by that? 
                                                                                                                     
71 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 40, at 153. 
72 LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 20, at 524. 
73 Id. at 525. For an account of a context-sensitive ‘sustainable jurisprudence,’ see Peter C. Oliver, 
“A Constitution Similar in Principle to That of the United Kingdom”: The Preamble, Constitutional 
Principles, and a Sustainable Jurisprudence, 65 MCGILL L.J. 207, 249–63 (2019). 
74 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 40, at 117–23. 
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A. Sovereignty, Independence, and Constitutional Amendment 
The central subject matter of my doctoral work—sovereignty, 
independence, and constitutional amendment—provides concrete 
examples. And it is not too difficult to combine each of these questions 
into one rich, familiar scenario.75  
After 1931, a country like Canada opted to retain a role for the United 
Kingdom Parliament where amendment of the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 
1931 was concerned.76 For all intents and purposes, then, the Westminster 
Parliament was the general amending formula for Canada.77 By making use 
of some of the Latham insights listed above, it was possible to assert that 
while the nature of Westminster sovereignty was, in the 1930s and later, 
either assumed by formalist error to be uncontrovertibly “continuing” in 
nature, or, more properly, “uncertain” and “evolving,” by 1982 it was 
clearly assumed, at least in Canada, that the Westminster Parliament, the 
general amending formula for Canada at that moment, could do what all 
amending formulas are assumed to be able to do: That is, to amend itself, 
to exercise a “self-embracing” sovereignty. And if British courts were ever 
to balk at this view after 1982, that would be of no concern so long as the 
Canadian Supreme Court took the view, as it soon did, that the 
independence process was complete and irreversible.78  
A similar story involving the same political and formal legal elements 
could be told in Grundnorm language, here again using Latham to a great 
extent, but also including insights that were not available to him.  
Regarding the Grundnorm, the Scandinavian realist Alf Ross had pointed 
out in the 1960s that amending an amending formula poses problems for 
Kelsen’s theory. According to Ross,79 if the original amending formula of a 
first historical constitution were used to amend itself, then, if as is almost 
                                                                                                                     
75 The balance of this Article focuses to a great extent on the recent constitutional history of 
Canada. Richard Kay has written on Canadian constitutional issues since at least 1982. A partial list of 
these publications would include: Richard Kay, Courts as Constitution-Makers in Canada and the 
United States, 4 SUP. CT. L. REV. 23 (1982); Richard Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in Canada 
and the United States, 7 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 111 (1984); Richard Kay, The Canadian Constitution and the 
Dangers of Establishment, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 361 (1992); Richard Kay, Book Review, 23 AM. REV. 
CAN. STUD. 624 (1993) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, JUDICIAL POWER AND THE CHARTER: 
CANADA AND THE PARADOX OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1993)); Richard Kay, The Secession 
Reference and the Limits of Law, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 327 (2003); Richard Kay, Canada’s 
Constitutional Cul-de-Sac, 35 AM. REV. CAN. STUD. 705 (2005) (reviewing PETER H. RUSSELL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS BECOME A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? (3d ed. 2004)). 
76 Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in Canada and the United States, supra note 75, at 112–13. 
77 Id. at 114, 122. 
78 Reference re Objection to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793, 806 
(Can.). The Supreme Court of Canada stated (unanimously): “The Constitution Act, 1982 is now in 
force. Its legality is neither challenged nor assailable. It contains a new procedure for amending the 
Constitution of Canada which entirely replaces the old one in its legal as well as in its conventional 
aspects.” Id. (emphasis added).  
79 ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 81 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1974) (1958). 
 
1470 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:5 
always assumed, the new amending formula is now the applicable 
amending formula, the legal system cannot be defined according to 
Kelsen’s usual terms, i.e. unbroken derivation from the first original 
constitution and the Grundnorm behind it.80 Hart issued a helpful reply 
pointing out, in essence, that Ross had overlooked the vital temporal 
element.81 Listed as logical propositions on a page, Ross’s first statement 
of the problem was right, but given that law is enacted through time rather 
than set out as a one-time set of logical statements, Ross’s problem could 
be overcome. Ross conceded Hart’s point,82 but at the price of adding some 
awkwardness to his theory, and, by necessary implication, Kelsen’s. In 
order to explain constitutional amendment, Ross believed that it was 
necessary to read into the Grundnorm not just the usual simple 
injunction—“obey the first historical Constitution”—but also the important 
qualifier “unless it is amended, in which case obey the amendment.”83 
What both the self-embracing interpretation of Westminster 
sovereignty and the Ross reformulation point to is the fact that the ultimate 
rule of a legal system can change by legal means, and not just by the sort 
of revolution noted by H.W.R. Wade. If self-embracing sovereignty is 
assumed, and if Hart and Ross’s temporal point is borne in mind, then, just 
as an amendment procedure could, the Westminster Parliament could use 
its sovereign powers simultaneously to enact a new Constitution for a 
newly independent country, including a new amendment procedure, and to 
terminate future Westminster Parliament’s power to legislative for that 
newly independent country.  This was “self-embracing sovereignty” in 
Hart’s terms. 
We also see here that in a world of self-embracing constitutional 
change there are effectively two different senses in which the word “legal 
system” can be used, both of which may be relevant in their own ways and 
on their own terms. The first is the logical-legal sense of legal system that 
Ross was initially most concerned with. If we ask why a law is valid in 
Ottawa in 2021, and if we are committed to following what Kelsen calls a 
chain of validity, we will find ourselves returning to the Westminster 
Parliament, which enacted Canada’s two key constitutional documents:84 
the Constitution Act, 186785 and the Constitution Act, 1982.86 It is this sort 
                                                                                                                     
80 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 111 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1949) 
(“All norms whose validity may be traced back to one and the same basic norm form a system of 
norms, or an order.”). 
81 HART, Self-Referring Laws, supra note 41, at 170, 177. 
82 Alf Ross, On Self-Reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 78 MIND 1, 21 (1969).  
83 For further discussion, see OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 14, at 
295–97.  
84 Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in Canada and the United States, supra note 75, at 112, 113 
& 113 n.9. 
85 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3 (UK). 
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of legal-logical analysis that has caused newly independent nations to fear 
for the authenticity of their independence.87 They seem inevitably linked, 
in a legal-logical sense, to the United Kingdom Parliament, and yet that is 
not what they intended or desired.  
However, once one accepts the possibility and coherence of 
self-embracing legal change, it is possible to see that the first sense of legal 
system is only needed when one wants to provide a full, rigorous 
explanation of a country’s tradition of respect for legal continuity and the 
rule of law. The second sense of legal system refers only to those rules that 
are active and available in the legal system at the present moment. Because 
of the self-embracing, fully-self-limiting process in 1982 by which the old 
amendment procedure was entirely replaced by a new amendment 
procedure, the Westminster is in no sense part of the legal system in the 
vital second sense.88 Because of the self-embracing logic, this is not a 
revolutionary act; it is a fully legal one. 
In Latham’s time through until the early 1960s, when only one version 
of sovereignty, Grundnorm and legal system were known to most 
constitutional observers, ultimate rules were either too adhesive or not 
adhesive enough. Continuing sovereignty was too adhesive in that it made 
it hard to achieve true independence. Wade’s “disguised revolution” and 
the positing of new Grundnormen provided an explanation for 
independence but at the cost of constitutional continuity. For that reason, 
they were not adhesive enough. 
In The Law and the Commonwealth, Latham was intent on 
contemplating whether the post-Statute of Westminster Commonwealth 
could be a new legal system.89 Had things worked out differently, the 
Commonwealth could have evolved into an advanced political and 
economic legal order along the lines of the European Union. Had that been 
the case, it is not hard to imagine that that system might have seen fit to 
confirm the continuing sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament, to 
ensure the power of Westminster to act as a convenient central legislator, 
and to ensure that “Member States” of that counter-factually imagined 
Commonwealth Union not be able to leave the Union easily.90 The facts on 
the ground that Latham was so astute to analyse would have made their 
                                                                                                                     
86 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1928, c. 11 (UK). 
87 For further discussion of this point, see Peter Oliver, Constitutions, Autochthonous, in MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (R. Wolfrum, F. Lachenmann & R. 
Grote eds., 2017). 
88 For more on this observation regarding these two different senses of the term “legal system,” 
see OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 14, at 342–44.  
89 LATHAM, THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 20, at 513, 609–10. 
90 I explore the counter-factual in greater detail in Peter C. Oliver, Change in the Ultimate Rules 
of a Legal System: Uncertainty, Hard Cases, Commonwealth Precedents and the Importance of 
Context, 26 KING’S L.J. 367 (2015). 
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mark on the evolving rule of recognition or Grundnorm, causing it to 
resolve into a confirmed “continuing” form. Latham was both the first to 
bring the Grundnorm to the British and Commonwealth world and the first 
to explore the evolution of the ultimate rule of a legal system as an 
essentially socio-legal phenomenon. 
As it turned out, the Commonwealth Union never came to be, the 
United Kingdom moved (for a time) ever-closer to Europe, and the 
countries of the former Empire achieved their independence one after the 
other. The local understandings of the ultimate rule had evolved not in the 
direction of continuing sovereignty but in the direction of its 
self-embracing alternative.  By the end of the twentieth century, in part as a 
result of the profound work begun by Latham, countries of the former 
British Empire had ceased to worry about the problem of what K.C. 
Wheare called “autochthony,”91 because it had become clear that 
independent countries could, consistent with the logic of self-embracing 
change, simultaneously respect constitutional continuity and the rule of 
law, and achieve full independence.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article was presented and is written in honour of Richard Kay 
and in great admiration for the body of work that he has so impressively 
produced over his career. As I indicated at the outset, that body of work 
displays great breadth and depth and it travels through time to make sure 
that we do not forget the ideas and legacy of constitutional writers who 
came before us. 
It was in that same spirit that I have tried to remember the life and 
work of R.T.E. Latham. I have always believed that his contributions to 
constitutional theory are worth remembering and reinvigorating. But in 
2019 when these remarks were presented, I was also reminded that Richard 
Latham’s life and example are an ongoing inspiration, given that he did his 
best to fight fascism and ignorance, help refugees in distress, ultimately 
giving his life in doing so.  
I am honoured and delighted to have been invited to participate in this 
wonderful conference. Many thanks to the organizers and to all the 
participants. And special thanks and congratulations to Richard Kay 
himself. 
                                                                                                                     
91 See K.C. WHEARE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH 89 
(Greenwood Press 1982) (1960) (discussing the constitutional principle of autochthony asserted by 
some members of the Commonwealth); Oliver, supra note 87. 
